Abstract. This paper presents a novel approach to automatically finding security vulnerabilities in the routing protocol OSPF -the most widely used protocol for Internet routing. We start by modeling the OSPF on (concrete) networks with a fixed number of routers in a specific topology. By using the model checking tool CBMC, we found several simple, previously unknown attacks on OSPF. In order to search for attacks in a family of networks with varied sizes and topologies, we define the concept of an abstract network which represents such a family. The abstract network A has the property that if there is an attack on A then there is a corresponding attack on each of the (concrete) networks represented by A. The attacks we have found on abstract networks reveal security vulnerabilities in the OSPF protocol, which can harm routing in huge networks with complex topologies. Finding such attacks directly on the huge networks is practically impossible. Abstraction is therefore essential. Further, abstraction enables showing that the attacks are general. That is, they are applicable in a large (even infinite) number of networks. This indicates that the attacks exploit fundamental vulnerabilities, which are applicable to many configurations of the network.
Introduction
This paper presents a novel approach to automatically finding security vulnerabilities in the routing protocol Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [13] . OSPF is the most widely used protocol for Internet routing, thus finding unknown vulnerabilities which are inherent to the design of the protocol is significant for Internet security. Manually identifying vulnerabilities in a complex protocol such as OSPF is a hard task which requires deep understanding and close acquaintance with the protocol.
We propose to find vulnerabilities automatically by using model checking techniques. In order to use model checking for our purpose we build a model for the protocol when running on a given network topology; we include in the model an attacker with predefined capabilities; and we specify the absence of a state in which an attack succeeds (to be defined later). If the model checker finds a state violating the specification, it returns a counterexample leading to that state. The counterexample being a run of the protocol is, in fact, an attack on the protocol.
A high level description of the OSPF protocol is given below. OSPF runs on each router in a network of routers. Its goal is to distribute the full network topology to all routers. The routers send each other messages describing their partial view of the network topology. When a router gets a message from its neighbor, it updates its database accordingly and floods the message on to all of its other neighbors. OSPF includes a mechanism for fighting against possible attacks. If a router gets a message in its own name that it did not originate, then the router initiates a "fight back" message in order to correct the topology view of all other routers.
We start by modeling (concrete) networks with a fixed number of routers in a specific topology, where each router runs the OSPF protocol. The attacker is just one of the routers running the same protocol, except that it can choose to send fake messages in the name of other routers. It can also choose to ignore messages sent to it. A state of the model consists of the databases and message queues of all routers in the network. We say that an attack succeeds in a state if (at least) one of the routers has a fake message in its database, and none of the routers has a message waiting to be sent. This means that no fight back is going to change the fake topology view of this router. Thus, the attack is persistent.
We ran the model checking tool CBMC [2] on several topologies. We note that the OSPF protocol is quite elaborate. Further, the size of the database of each router is proportional to the size of the network. We therefore limited the topology sizes in order to fit in the model checker capacity. Nevertheless, we have found several simple, previously unknown attacks. We also found a known, more a subtle attack.
The limitation of the approach described so far is clear. It can only check a specific and small network topology which may expose only a part of the protocol's functionality. In order to allow for a good coverage of the protocol's functionality many other specific topologies need to be checked, while taking more time and human resources.
We therefore develop an approach which can search for attacks in a parameterized network, consisting of a family of networks with varied sizes and topologies. We define an abstract network, that represents such a family. The abstract network A has the property that if there is an attack on A then there is a corresponding attack on each of the (concrete) networks represented by A. An abstract network allows to reveal security vulnerabilities in the OSPF protocol, which can harm routing in huge networks with complex topologies. Finding such attacks directly on the huge networks is practically impossible. Abstraction is therefore essential.
The abstraction is defined on all levels of the model: We define an abstract topology which represents a family of concrete topologies. An abstract state represents a set of concrete states. The correspondence between abstract transitions and their concrete counterpart is more subtle. Each abstract transition represents a set of finite concrete runs, one in each of the concrete topologies represented by A. As a result, our abstract model is unusual: It under-approximates each member in a family of concrete models. That is, every run of the abstract model has a corresponding run in each of the concrete models represented by it. This is an important characteristics of our abstraction as it allows us to find general attacks on an abstract network which are manifested in each of the concrete models it represents. Thus, these attacks are applicable in a large (even infinite) number of networks. This indicates that they exploit fundamental vulnerabilities, which are applicable to many configurations of the network. This is in contrast to finding a specific attack that is only applicable for a single perhaps marginal network configuration.
We emphasize that the contributions of this work go beyond the security analysis of OSPF. The abstract concept and definition can be beneficial for finding security vulnerabilities in other protocols as well. To summarize, the contributions of this work are:
-We analyzed the OSPF routing protocol and automatically found attacks on it.
-By finding general attacks which are applicable to families of networks we revealed fundamental security vulnerabilities in the OSPF protocol. -We developed a novel technique for parameterized networks which is suitable for finding a counterexample (in our case an attack) on each member of the family. -This work is a first step towards finding security vulnerabilities in other distributed network protocols.
Related Work
There are a few works that present a security analysis of the OSPF protocol. Most such works (e.g., [16, 17, 6, 14] ) focus on LSA falsification attacks. Only two past works ( [6] and [14] ) present OSPF attacks with a persistent effect while evading a fight-back. This low number of works stand in contrast to the centrality of OSPF to Internet routing. This can be partially explained by the difficulty to do a manual and thorough security analysis of complex distributed network protocols. There are some works that propose a security analysis of the design of network protocols based on model checking (e.g., [11, 12, 8] ) . All of past works check a given network configuration with a predetermined set of participants. In particular, some works (e.g., [10, 4, 9] ) analyzed the security of OSPF and other routing protocols, while considering only a given network model. As other distributed network protocols the functionality of a routing protocol is highly dependent of the number of participants in the protocol and the network topology. Hence, current works that employ model checking for distributed network protocols may not cover the entire protocol's functionality.
Reasoning about families of systems, also known as parameterized systems, is a known research area (e.g. [5, 7, 3, 15, 1] ). Most works present an abstract model which over-approximates all members in the family and is used to verify that they all satisfy a given property. We, on the other hand, define an abstract model which underapproximates each member in the family. Our abstract model is therefore most suitable for finding attacks on all members. To the best of our knowledge, no similar reasoning has been applied before to parameterized systems.
Modeling OSPF

OSPF Basics
The Internet is clustered into sets of connected networks and routers called Autonomous Systems (AS). Each AS is administered by a single authority, such as a large organization, or an Internet service provider. Within each AS a routing protocol is run. Its aim is to allow routers to construct their routing tables, while dynamically adapting to changes in the AS topology. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [13] is currently used within most ASes on the Internet. It was developed and standardized by the IETF organization.
Each OSPF router composes a list of all its links to neighboring routers and their costs. This list is termed Link State Advertisement (LSA). Each LSA is flooded throughout the AS. Every router compiles a database of the LSAs from all routers in the AS, thus having a complete view of the AS topology. This allows a router to calculate the least cost paths between it and every other router in the AS. As a result, the router's routing table is formed.
A new instance of each LSA is advertised periodically every 30 minutes, by default. Every LSA has a sequence number which is incremented with every new advertised instance. A more recent LSA instance with a higher sequence number will always take precedence over an older instance with a lower sequence number. An LSA includes the following fields: a)src -the router which just sent the LSA; LSA; b) dest -the router to which the LSA is destined; c) orig -the router which first advertised the d) seqsequence number.
Two routers in the AS may be connected over a point-to-point link. A subset of two or more routers may be connected over a transit network. One router in every transit network is selected to act as a designated router. During the flooding of an LSA each router sends the LSA to all its neighbors (except the neighbor from which the LSA was received). To alleviate flooding load this rule has an exception: a non-designated router may flood an LSA over a transit network only to the designated router of that network. The designated router will send it to all the other routers in that network.
A common goal for an OSPF attacker is to advertise a fake LSA on behalf of some other router in the AS. Such an attack changes the view other routers have of the AS topology and consequently changes their routing tables. The primary measure by which OSPF defends against such attacks is the "fight-back" mechanism. Once a victim router receives an instance of its own LSA which is newer than the last instance it originated, it immediately advertises a newer instance of the LSA with a higher sequence number which cancels out the false one. This mechanism prevents most OSPF attacks from persistently falsifying an LSA of another router.
The Concrete Model
In the following we present the concrete model for OSPF we used to find attacks. Our model assumes as a starting point a stable routing state in the AS. Namely, all the routers advertised their LSAs and calculated their routing tables. In particular, no LSA flooding is in progress or about to start. The LSA databases of all the routers are complete and identical. Without loss of generality we assume that the sequence numbers of all the LSAs that have been advertised are 0. In addition, designated routers for all transit networks have been selected. The model is composed of three entities: (AS) topology which models a concrete topology of the AS, Router which models a legitimate router inside the AS; Attacker which models a malicious router inside the AS. The order of the routers that process its incoming LSAs is specified in a non-deterministic fashion.
Autonomous System Topology Model
We denote the concrete topology by T c = (R, S, E, DR c ), where R is the set of routers, S ⊆ 2 R is the set of transit networks, which we refer to as sub-network, E ⊆ R × R is the set of point to point links, which we refer to as edges, and DR c : S → R maps sub-networks to their designated routers. For simplicity of presentation we assume that each router belongs to at least one subnetwork. We emphasize that the set of routers forming a sub-network are directly connected to each other as if they were forming a clique. Nonetheless, those connections are not part of the set E which only includes point-to-point links. Figure 1 depict an example of a topology. . The circles marked as sri represent singleton routers; the triangle ar1 represents an abstract router; the circle sn1 represents an abstract sub-network; and the double circles sti represent sub-topologies. The bold circle represents a designated router (i.e., sr2 is the designated router in the sub-network sn1).
Router Model
The router model executes the standard functionality of the protocol. We model only part of the functionality defined by the OSPF standard since a large model might be infeasible for model checking. Nonetheless, our model captures the protocol's essential operations which any attack must exploit. The functionality we modeled includes: (1) LSA message structure. We do not model the actual contents of each LSA, i.e. the list of advertised links and their costs, because the LSA content has no material affect on the attack technique used to advertise a fake LSA. Figure 3 gives a high level overview of the router procedure.
Attacker Model In our work we assume that an attacker is one of the routers of the autonomous system. Other routers treat the attacker as a legitimate router. The attacker is free from the protocol's standard and is able to ignore incoming messages and to originate messages arbitrarily. In particular, an attacker may originate fake LSAs on behalf of other routers in the topology. The model indicates such LSAs by a special isFake flag, which is not part of the OSPF standard, and legitimate routers do not make use of it. This flag allows us to easily define the specifications for the model (see next paragraph).
Another important capability of the attacker is sending an LSA directly to a router which is not one of its immediate neighbors. We call this unicast sending. The formal model we use for OSPF is a finite state machine with global states and transitions. In order to obtain a finite model suitable for model checking, we impose a predefined bound SB on the sequence number of messages, and a predefined bound K on the queue size of each router. The queue of each router consists of up to K messages of the form m = (src, dest, orig, seq, isF ake), taken from the message domain M = R × R × R × {0, ..., SB} × {T, F }. The database of router r, r.DB : R → {0, . . . , SB} × {T, F }, includes for each router r ′ a sequence number of the last message it originated, and a flag isFake indicating whether this message was in fact originated by the attacker and not by r ′ . A global state σ = {r.DB |r ∈ R } ∪ {r.Q |r ∈ R } consists of a database and a message queue for each of the routers in the topology, including the attacker. An r-transition between two global states corresponds to an application of the router r procedure (given in Figure 3 ). Note that an r-transition may change, in addition to the queue and the database of r, the queues of some of its neighbors. A run of the model consists of a sequence of global states σ 1 , . . . σ n , such that for each i, a router r from R is chosen nondeterministically, and an r-transition is applied to σ i , resulting in σ i+1 .
Specification
Our aim is to discover attacks on OSPF that allow an attacker to persistently falsify LSAs of legitimate routers. Our specification for the absence of attack requires either one of the following two conditions to be met:
1. No router installs a fake LSA in its database. 2. At least one message resides in a router's queue.
The first condition verifies that the attacker has not fooled another router to install a fake LSA. The second condition relates to the attack's persistency. If not all the routers' queues are empty then the router whose LSA has been falsified might still fight back and revert the effect of the attack. Note that the violation of the specification defines the outcome of a successful persistent attack regardless of a specific attack technique.
A model checker will search for a violation of the specification. When found, it will return a counterexample in the form of a run of the model which leads to a violating state. This run is actually an attack on OSPF.
Example of Attacks on OSPF
To find counterexamples, i.e. attacks, for which the above specification does not hold we use CMBC, a bounded model checker tool [2] . CMBC can formally verify C programs, while utilizing predefined bounds on the model. In our model, we bounded the number of cycles by 20, such that in each cycle any router with a non empty queue or the attacker, can run its procedure, for all possible interleavings. In order to have a finite model which is rather small, we used a bound of K = 4 for the queue size, and a bound of SB = 8 for the bound on sequence numbers. We also bounded the number of messages that can be originated by the attacker by 3.
When an attack is found the model checker outputs a path of global concrete states ending with a state that violates the specification. Figure 4 depicts an example of a topology with three sub-networks: {r1, r2}, {r3, r4}, and {r0}. r1 and r4 acts as designated routers. The router r0 is attached to r1 and r4 using point-to-point links. In this topology r3 is the attacker. Note that although there are no edges between routers in the same sub-network, they are considered directly connected. In the following we describe some of the attacks we found using the above concrete model having the topology depicted in Fig. 4 . The first two attacks are simple albeit previously unpublished attacks. The state explosion problem of the model checking impedes finding more complex attacks which may only be exhibited on larger topologies.
Attack #1
The attacker (r3) originates a fake LSA on behalf of r4 directly to r2 (using unicast sending), while falsifying the source to be r1. The fields of the fake LSA are: src = r1, dest = r2, orig = r4, seq = 1, and isFake = true. r2 receives this LSA while considering it to be a valid LSA sent by r1. Since the sequence number of the attacker's LSA is larger than that of the LSA instance installed in r2's database, r2 installs the attacker's LSA in its database. Since r2 received the message from r1, it does not flood it back to it. Since r2 has no other links no further messages are sent in the topology. Hence, the specification of our model is violated.
Attack #2
The following attack relies on the fact that the routers' queues are bounded. The attacker continuously sends the following message many times: (src = r3, orig = r0, dest = r4, seq = 1, isFake = true). The number of sent copies should be larger than the bound on the size of the routers' queues. The messages are received by r4 which floods the first message to r0. r0 then originates a fight-back message m ′ with seq = 2. Since the queue of r4 is full, m ′ will be discarded leaving r4 with the fake message installed in the database. All subsequent fake messages flooded to r0 will not trigger fight-back, since their sequence number (1) is smaller than that of the last message originated by r0 (m ′ with seq = 2). We note that the OSPF standard makes use of a reliable delivery of messages by leveraging acknowledgment messages. Hence a real router retransmits a message until it receives an acknowledgment. Our model does not include this functionality. Nonetheless, this attack would still be feasible in real life if the attacker continued sending messages to keep r4's queue full.
Attack #3
The following attack was first described in [14] . The attacker sends the following two LSA messages:
First, m1 is received and installed by r4. Then, r4 floods it to r0. Afterward, m2 is received by r4. Since it has a higher sequence number than m1, m2 supersedes it in r4's database. m2 is also flooded to r0. r0 processes and sends both messages to r1, while m2 is the last to be installed in its database. Once r1 receives m1 it immediately originates a fight-back message m3 with seq = 2 and floods it to all its neighbors. r1 then receives m2. Since m2 and m3 have equal sequence number (2), m2 is not considered newer than m3, hence r1 does not send another fight-back message and ignores m2. Once r0 receives m3, it does not consider it newer than m2 which is currently installed in its database. Hence, it ignores m3. Since r4 installed the fake message m2 and no more messages are waiting to be sent the specification of our model is violated.
An Abstract Network and Its Matching Concrete Networks
In the previous section we showed how attacks can be found on concrete models. Due to the state explosion problem, the models that can be handled are very small in size and hence restricted in their topologies. We would like to extend our search for attacks to larger and more complex topologies. Further, we are interested in general attacks, which are insensitive to most of the topology's details and therefore can be applied in a family of topologies.
In order to achieve that, we define an abstract model which can represent a family of concrete models. The models in the family are similar in some aspects of their topologies but may differ in many other aspects.
The abstract model consists of an abstract topology and an abstract protocol. The abstract topology includes abstract components that may represent a large number of routers and sub-networks. The abstract protocol is an adjustment of OSPF to the abstract components.
We define several level of abstract components. The most abstract component is the sub-topology, which represents any number of concrete sub-networks. The edges between the sub-topology and the rest of the topology are not abstracted. As a result, routers within the sub-topology which are connected to these edges remain unabstracted as well.
These routers are called singleton routers. The concrete routers they represent are called visible. All other routers within the sub-topology and the edges among them are fully abstracted, and are referred to as invisible.
Another abstract component is the abstract router which represents a set of concrete routers, all contained within the same sub-network, and have no edges outside of the sub-network. An abstract sub-network consists of a set of abstract routers and a set of singleton routers. As with sub-topologies, the singleton routers in a sub-network are unabstracted. They represent a single concrete router whose edges are un-abstracted too.
We require that each singleton router belongs to either a sub-topology or a nonempty set of abstract sub-networks.
The intuition behind the definition of an abstract topology is as follows. The unabstracted routers are those that may participate in an attack. The others are needed to form a topology that brings unabstracted routers to manifest more of their OSPF functionality and therefore expose more security vulnerabilities. In addition, abstracted routers allow to show that a found attack is general and applicable to a family of topologies.
Clearly, the attacker is always an (un-abstracted) singleton router. Moreover, the messages sent by the attacker are un-abstracted as well. That is, their originator, source, and destination fields refer to singleton routers.
As with concrete models, model checking can find several attacks on the same abstract topology. More attacks can be found by checking additional, different abstract topologies.
Recall that our goal is to find an attack on the abstract model and to conclude that a corresponding attack is applicable in all concrete models represented by it. To achieve this, we need to impose some constraints on abstract sub-topologies. These constraints will guarantee that for every abstract transition and every concrete topology represented by the abstract topology, we can find a corresponding finite concrete run.
For a sub-topology st, recall that each singleton router in st represents a single concrete visible router. We require that in the part of the concrete topology which is represented by st, each of its visible routers must belong to a different (concrete) subnetwork. Also, visible routers in st may not be directly connected to each other, but should be connected to at least one invisible router. Further, the invisible routers in st form a strongly connected component. These constraints guarantee that if a message is flooded to st through one of its singleton router r, then there is a concrete run along which the message is opened by all invisible routers prior to being opened by any other singleton router.
While these constraints seem quite restrictive, our abstract topologies still represent a large variety of topologies of different sizes. As shown in Section 5, some nontrivial attacks were found on them. Many of these constraints can be removed for the price of much more complex definitions and correctness proof. We choose to present a simpler version here, and to demonstrate its usability.
Abstract Topology
Formally, an abstract topology is denoted by T A = (SR, ST, AR, SN, E A , DR A ) where, SR is a set of abstract singleton routers, ST ⊆ 2 SR is a set of sub-topologies, AR is a set of abstract routers, SN ⊆ 2 AR∪SR is a set of abstract sub-networks, and E A ⊆ SR × SR is a set of undirected edges, each representing a point to point link between two abstract singleton routers. Finally, DR A : SN → SR is a function that maps sub-networks to their designated router, which must be from SR. Figure 2 presents an abstract topology. Note that, similarly to the concrete case, connections between routers within the same sub-network are not depicted in the figure.
Matching Abstract and Concrete Topologies
Next we define a matching relation between abstract and concrete topologies. The matching relation adhere to the intuitive explanation given above. Let T A = (SR, ST, AR, SN, E A , DR A ) be an abstract topology and T C = (R, S, E, DR C ) be a concrete topology. A relation
is a matching relation between T A and T C if it satisfies the following constraints:
-H restricted to each one of its domains is a 1-1 function. For instance, H∩(SR × R) is a 1-1 function. By abuse of notation we refer to it as H : SR → R. -A sub-topology st represents a set of concrete sub-networks S ′ . Each singleton router in st is matched to a concrete router in a sub-network in S ′ . Different singleton routers in st are matched to routers in different sub-networks in S ′ . -An abstract sub-network sn represents a concrete sub-network s such that each singleton router in sn is matched to a router in s, and each abstract router in sn is matched to a set of routers in s. Moreover, every router in s has a matched component in sn. -Each concrete sub-network is matched to either an abstract sub-network or a subtopology. -There is an abstract edge between two singleton routers if and only if there is a concrete edge between their matched routers.
The full formal definition of H appears in the appendix. For example, the relation H, given below, is a matching relation between T A from Figure 2 and T C from Figure 1 .
((sr2, sr5) , (r9, r12))}
Global Abstract States
Let T A be an abstract topology and let AC = ST ∪ AR ∪ SR be the set of components in the abstract topology. The message domain in the abstract model is M = AC × AC × ORIGS × {0, ..., SB} × {T, F }, where ORIGS ⊆ SR is a predefined set of originators which can be used by the attacker in its messages. Abstract messages consist of the same fields as concrete messages. An abstract state is defined by σ A = {ac.DB |ac ∈ AC }∪{ac.Q |ac ∈ AR ∪ CR }, where for every component ac ∈ AC, the structure of its database is identical to that of a concrete component, ac.DB : ORIGS → {0, ..., SB} × {T, F }, except that here it is only defined for the subset ORIGS ⊆ SR. In addition, for every ac ∈ AR ∪ CR, ac.Q is a queue of up to K messages. The database is restricted to ORIGS since in our setting (see section 2.2 ) only the attacker originates messages, and those messages have orig ∈ ORIGS. Thus, there is no need for ac.DB to contain entries of other originators.
Note that, we do not define a queue for sub-topologies st, since flooding within st is always described as a single abstract transition. Each singleton router in st has a queue. Thus, a queue for st would have represented the queues of all invisible routers, matched to st. However, as we prove in Appendix A, the queues of all invisible routers are empty whenever the abstract transition begins or ends. Thus, there is no need to represent their content.
Matching abstract and concrete states
Let T A and T C be an abstract and concrete topologies and let H be their matching relation. In order to define a matching between abstract and concrete states, we first define a matching between abstract and concrete databases and queues.
We use h to denote a function that matches abstract databases, messages, queues, and global states to sets of their concrete counterparts.
1. An abstract database DB A matches a concrete database DB C , denoted DB C ∈ h(DB A ), if for each o ∈ ORIGS, the entry for o in DB A is identical to the entry of H(o) in DB C . 2. An abstract message m and a concrete message m
.seq, and m ′ .isF ake = m.isF ake. Since orig is a singleton router and since seq and IsF ake are un-abstracted, they have a single matching.
3. An abstract queue matches a concrete queue if (a) For a singleton router sr, each message m in its queue is matched with a sequence of (one or more) concrete messages in h(m).
The reason for matching more than one concrete message with m is that an abstract transition may add only one message to the queue. On the other hand, the concrete run that correspond to this transition consists of several concrete transitions, each of which may add a matching message to the queue. This is because, when sr is part of a sub-topology st, then the invisible routers represented by st may flood the message several times to sr, via different paths in the sub-topology. We can now define matching of abstract and concrete states. σ C ∈ h (σ A ) if the following conditions holds
That is, queues of matching components must match.
That is, databases of matching components must match.
Abstract Transitions and their Matching Concrete Transitions
Similarly to the concrete model, an abstract transition between two global abstract states corresponds to an application of the procedure of one of the abstract components. The abstract model includes procedures for a singleton router, an abstract router, and an attacker (which is a special kind of a singleton router). Our model does not include a procedure for a sub-topology. Instead, its behavior is defined as part of the procedure of singleton routers included in it.
A high-level description of the procedure of a singleton router sr is given in Figure 5 . It is similar to the procedure of a concrete router, except that it does not handle messages whose destination is not sr. This is because in the abstract model such messages are sent by unicast directly to their destination. The singleton router procedure can perform either flooding or fight back. Figure 6 describes the flooding procedure performed by a singleton router (as part of its procedure). F D A (sr, m.src) returns the set of abstract components to which sr floods a message m obtained from component src. The fight back procedure is similar, except that F D A is replaced by F BD A . The definitions of F D A and F BD A are given in the appendix. The statement ac 1 .Q ′ = ac 1 .Q {m sr→ac1 } performs an update of ac 1 's queue. The resulting queue, ac 1 .Q ′ , is obtained by concatenating the old queue ac 1 .Q with a message which is identical to m, except that its src is sr and its destination is ac 1 .
The procedure of an abstract router is simpler. It only installs a message from its queue in its database and does not perform flood or fight back. This is because it is part of a single abstract sub-network, and is not connected by any edges.
An ac-abstract transition corresponds to a single application of the procedure for abstract component ac. This transition may represent either a single concrete transition or a sequence of concrete transitions (i.e., a concrete run), depending on the type of ac and on the message content. Below we detail a few non-trivial cases where abstract transitions correspond to a concrete run. The proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix shows that for every concrete topology T C represented by an abstract topology T A and for every abstract transition in T A , a corresponding concrete run as detailed below can be found in T C .
Case 1
Consider an abstract transition in which a singleton router sr floods a message m, where sr is within a sub-topology st, and st belongs to the flooding destinations of sr.
In such a case, the concrete run represented by the abstract transition includes, in addition to the flooding done by sr, the flooding applied by the invisible routers in H(st). By the end of this run, all invisible routers within st have already removed m from their queue, updated their databases (if their databases were less updated), and flooded m further to the rest of the visible routers in H(st).
Case 2 Consider an abstract transition in which a singleton router sr in a sub-topology st floods a message m, where m.src = st.
This abstract transition represents a concrete run in which H(sr) floods m. In addition, invisible routers in H(st), which are included in the flooding destinations of H(sr), remove m from their queue and ignore it.
Case 3 Consider an abstract transition in which the attacker sends a message m by unicast to a destination which is not one of its neighbors. That is, the message m is added to the queue of its destination.
This abstract transition represents a sequence of concrete transitions in which each router on the routing path which is not the destination, sends the message according to its routing table, without opening the message. 
Corollary 1. An abstract attack found on an abstract topology T A , has a corresponding attack on each matching topology T C .
Proof Sketch -We show that for each abstract transition, there is a concrete finite run, such that the initial states of the transition and of the run are matching, and so are their final states. -An abstract attack is an abstract run for which the final state violates our specification. A concrete state matching an abstract state which violates the specification, also violates the specification. Thus, the corresponding paths are concrete attacks.
The full proof of the Theorem appears in the appendix.
Examples of attacks on OSPF in the abstract model
In this section we describe a few attacks, found on different abstract models.
Attack #1 This attack has been found on the abstract topology T
The attacker is sr2. The set of predefined originators is ORIGS = {sr1}. The attacker originates a fake message on behalf of sr1: m = (src = sr2, dest = sr5, orig = sr1, seq = 1, isF ake = T ) sr5 receives this message while considering it to be a valid message, sent by sr2. Since the sequence number of m is larger than that of the message instance installed in sr5's database, sr5 installs m in its database, and floods it. The fake message will be flooded and installed in the databases of sr5, st2, sr4, sr3. When m is installed by sr3, it will be flooded to the attacker sr2, since sr2 is the designated router of the sub-network sn1. The attacker will choose to ignore m, thus preventing this message from being flooded to sr1, and avoiding fight back. Since no more messages are waiting to be sent, the specification of our model is violated. More specifically, the abstract path that represents the attack can be described as:
where each abstract transition is labeled by the abstract component in SR ∪ AR whose procedure was applied. The contents of the abstract global states can be described as follows, where we denote only the changes between two consequent states:
By Theorem 1, the abstract attack has a corresponding concrete attack on each matching concrete topology, and in particular on the matching concrete topology T C from Figure 1 .
Below we only describe parts of the concrete attack on T C . We present, for some abstract transitions of the attack π, a sequence of concrete transitions they represent. For instance, the abstract transition σ 1 sr5 − − → σ 2 matches the following sequence of concrete
′ . In this concrete sequence the message is flooded and installed within the invisible routers represented by the sub-topology st2. This demonstrates case 1 that was explained in section 3.5. Another example for a non-trivial abstract transition, is σ 2 sr4 − − → σ 3 , which matches the sequence of concrete transitions: σ 13
′ . This demonstrates case 2 that was explained in section 3.5. Attack #2 T A is the abstract topology presented in Figure 7 . The attacker is sr3. The set of predefined originators is ORIGS = {sr1}. The attacker originates a fake message on behalf of sr1: m = (src = sr1, dest = sr2, orig = sr1, seq = 1, isF ake = T ), which is sent by unicast to sr2. sr2 installs the fake message in its database and floods it only to the sub-topology st2 due to flooding rules of OSPF. Therefore, in the final state the queues of all abstract components are empty, and the databases of sr2, st2 are installed with the fake message. This state violates the specification. Attack #3 T A is the abstract topology presented in Figure 8 . The attacker is sr3. The set of predefined originators is ORIGS = {sr2}. The attacker sends the following two LSAs (using unicast sending):
1. m1 = (src = sr3, dest = sr2, orig = sr2, seq = 1, isF ake = T ) 2. m2 = (src = sr4, dest = sr5, orig = sr2, seq = 2, isF ake = T )
As a result, sr2 sends a fight back message m3 with orig = sr2, seq = 2, isF ake = F , but sr5 opens m3 after it has already installed m2 in its database, and thus it will ignore the fight back message and will remain with the fake message.
Conclusions
Our search for attacks on both concrete and abstract models reveals several vulnerabilities in the OSPF protocol.
A vulnerability stems from the basic characteristics of IP networks that a message is opened only by its destination. Further, the flooding procedure does not flood a message back to its source. As a result, a fake message in the name of router r (orig = r) might be sent through r to some router r ′ , without r opening it. r ′ will not flood the message to r since it appears to be coming from r. Thus, r will not initiate a fight back (see Example of abstract attack #2 in section 5, and concrete attack #1 in section 2.5).
Another vulnerability originates from the central role of the designated router. If the attacker plays this role then by ignoring messages it can stop message flooding, including fight back messages, to other routers in his sub-network, thus making an attack persistent (see Example of abstract attack #1 in section 5).
A Appendix
A.1 Formal definition of abstract topology
We denote the abstract topology by T A = (SR, ST, AR, SN, E A , DR A ), where -SR is a set of abstract singleton routers, each of which representing, a single concrete router.
SR is a set of sub-topologies. A sub topology contains a set of abstract singleton routers from which there are edges to other components in the abstract topology. Each sub-topology represents a set of concrete sub-networks which forms a strongly connected component in the concrete topology.
-AR is a set of abstract routers. Each abstract router represents a set of concrete routers within the same sub-network in the concrete topology.
AR∪SR is a set of abstract sub-networks. Each abstract sub-network represents a single concrete sub-network.
-E A ⊆ SR × SR is a set of undirected edges, each representing a point to point link between two abstract singleton routers. -DR A : SN → SR is a function that maps sub-networks to their designated router, which must be from SR.
We will use the following notations: sr denotes a singleton router in SR, st denotes a sub-topology in ST , ar denotes an abstract router in AR, sn denotes a sub-network in SN , r denotes a concrete router in R, s denotes a concrete sub-network in S. Formal definition of constraints imposed on the abstract topology T A :
1. A singleton router cannot be in both a sub-network and a sub-topology, but has to be in either a sub-topology or a sub-network: ∀sr, sn : (sr ∈ sn ⇒ ¬∃st : (srst)) ∀sr, st (sr ∈ st ⇒ ¬∃sn : (sr ∈ sn)) ∀sr ((∃st [sr ∈ st]) ∨ (∃s [sr ∈ s])) 2. A singleton router cannot be in more than one sub-topology: ∀st 1 , st 2 : (st 1 ∩ st 2 = ∅) 3. E A does not include edges between routers within the same abstract topology:
A.2 Formal definition of matching relation between abstract and concrete topologies
Let T A = (SR, ST, AR, SN, E A , DR A ) be an abstract topology. Let T C = (R, S, E, DR C ) be a concrete topology. A relation
is a matching relation between T A and T C if it satisfies the following constraints: Constraints related to the matching between SR and R:
1. H ∩(SR × R) is a 1-1 function. We will denote this part of H by abuse of notation: H : SR → R. In fact, all other parts of H are also constrained to be a 1-1 function, and thus this notation will apply to all parts. 2. An abstract sub-network sn contains a singleton router sr iff the matched concrete sub-network H(sn) contains the matched router H(sr) .
Given the sub-topology st and a singleton router sr ∈ st, all concrete sub-networks that contain H (sr)must be matched to the sub-topology (because a sub-topology cannot represent a partial sub-network).
For each singleton router in a sub-topology, there must be a matching concrete router in the matched part of the concrete topology.
Singleton routers within the same sub-topology must be matched with concrete routers which are in different sub-networks on the concrete topology.
Constraints related to the matching between AR and 2 R :
1. H ∩ AR × 2 R is a 1-1 function. 2. Any 2 sets of concrete routers that are matched with different abstract routers must be disjoint.
The set of concrete routers that is matched with an abstract router, must be in the concrete sub-network that is matched with the abstract sub-network of the abstract router.
Constraints related to the matching between SN and S:
For each router r in a concrete sub-network which is matched to an abstract subnetwork in the abstract topology, there should either exist a matching singleton router in the matching abstract-sub-network, or an abstract router in the abstract sub-network that is matched with a set of concrete routers in the concrete subnetwork, which includes this concrete router r.
Constraints related to the matching between ST and 2 S :
2. Any two sets of concrete sub-networks which are matched with different subtopologies in the abstract topology, must be disjoint.
For each st ∈ ST , the sub-graph formed by
s in the concrete network is a strongly connected component, taking into account the implicit links within subnetworks, which are not part of E.
∀st [H (st) = ∅]
5. For each st ∈ ST , the sub-graph formed by
in the concrete network is a strongly connected component, taking into account the implicit links within sub-networks, which are not part of E.
Constraints related to the matching between E A and E:
2. An edge between two singleton routers in the abstract topology must be matched with an edge between two concrete routers, which are matched with the singleton routers.
A concrete edge between routers that have matching abstract singleton routers, should be matched with the edge between the singleton routers.
There is no concrete edge between concrete router which is represented by an abstract router in the abstract topology.
(r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ E ⇒ (¬∃ar : (r 1 ∈ H (ar) ∨ r 2 ∈ H (ar)))
More global constraints on the matching relation H 1. Each singleton router that is a designated router in the abstract topology, should be matched with a concrete router which is also designated. ∀sn, ∀sr [DR A (sn) = sr ⇒ DR C (H (sn)) = H (sr)] 2. For each concrete router which is designated, if it has a matched singleton router, then it also should be designated in the matching sub-network.
Any two different kinds of abstract components are matched with disjoint sets of concrete routers in the concrete topology.
-∀st, ∀sr
A.3 Formal definition of flooding and fight back destinations
Flooding Destinations in a concrete topology We define a flooding destination function F D C : R × R → 2 R such that given a destination router dest and a source router src, F D C (dest, src) is the set of routers to which dest will flood an LSA message received from src.
F D C (dest, src) is the minimal set that contains the following routers:
Fight Back Destinations in a concrete topology The fight back destinations function F BD C : R → 2 R defines, for each router r, the set of routers to which r will flood an LSA fight back message originated by it. F BD C (r)is the minimal set that contains the following routers:
Flooding Destinations in an abstract topology
is the set of abstract components in AC to which dest will flood an LSA message received from src.
1. F D A (dest, src) for dest ∈ SR is the minimal set that contains the following routers:
Note: in the abstract model, if src is a sub-topology, there might be flooding back to the sub-topology in the concrete model, but since we assume messages originated from the attacker do not have an abstract src field, we can be sure that the sub-topology will ignore the flooded message(since the message must have arrived by regular flooding, thus it has installed the flooded LSA in its database), and thus we do not include it in the flooding destination. (It actually defines another kind of a macro step. The hidden flooding will be taken into account in the translation of the abstract path into a concrete one). 2. F D A (dest, src) for dest ∈ ST is the minimal set that contains the following routers:
Fight back destinations in an abstract topology We define F BD A : SR → 2 AC be a fight back destinations function, such that given an abstract singleton router sr,F BD A (sr) is the set of abstract components to which sr will flood an LSA fight back message originated by it. F BD A (sr) is the minimal set that contains the following abstract components in AC:
A.4 Correctness proof of the Theorem Lemma 1: Matching flooding destinations Let T A be an abstract topology, and T C a matching concrete topology, such that H is their matching relation. The following matching between flooding destinations exists:
We refer to matching floodings, i.e, an abstract message is flooded by r, and a matching concrete message is flooded by H (r). Note that Q represents a components queue before the flooding , and Q ′ represents the queue after the flooding. When denoting r ′ ∈ H (c) for some c ∈ AR ∪ SR, we actually refer to r ′ = H (c) in the case where c ∈ SR. Proof 1. Let r ∈ SR, src ∈ SR ∪ ST , such that r receives an LSA from src and floods it to F D A (r, src). We will prove the claim for any possible flooding destinations, according to the definition of the function F D A : (a) For each (r, c) ∈ E A such that src = c, c ∈ F D A (r, src) (and c ∈ SR due to the definition of E A ). According to matching defined between abstract and concrete topologies, we know that for each (r, c) ∈ E A there exists a matching edge of the form: (H (r) , H (c)) ∈ E. If src ∈ SR, then it can be immediately inferred that src = c ⇒ H (src) = H (c). Therefore, according to the definition of F D C , we can then infer that
, because if the message is flooded to c in the abstract model, then a matching message is flooded to H (c) in the concrete model, and thus their queues matching is preserved after the flooding. If src ∈ ST , then we know that in the concrete version, the concrete src denoted as src C that flooded the message to H(r) had to be an invisible router (because there is no direct link between any two visible routers in a sub-topology). This implies that H (c) = src C . Therefore, according to the definition of F D C function: H (c) ∈ F D C (H (r) , src C ). Thus, the abstract flooding to c matches the concrete flooding to H(c), and we can infer that H (c) .
According to the matching with the concrete topology, DR (H (sn)) = H (r). for each c ∈ C sn such that c ∈ SR, we know that H (c) ∈ H (sn). Also, we know hat c = r ⇒ H (c) = H (r). In addition, since c = src, it implies that the concrete src denoted as src C is necessarily not H (c) as explained in the previous case (a). Therefore: H (c) ∈ F D C (H (r) , src c ). (if src ∈ SR then src c = H (src) and if src ∈ ST then src c ∈ H (src) such that src c is a neighbor of H (r)). This implies that for each c ∈ C sn such that c ∈ SR, H (c) .
For each c ∈ C sn such that c ∈ AR, we know that H (c) ⊆ H (sn). Also, we know that c = r ⇒ ∀r
. This implies that for each c ∈ C sn such that c ∈ AR, ∀r
If DR (sn) = r and src = DR (sn) then DR (sn) ∈ F D A (r, src): According to the matching with the concrete topology, we can infer that DR (H (sn)) = H (r) and that
(r ∈ st) and src = st then st ∈ F D A (r, src). This case is irrelevant to the lemma, because it only relates to a flooding destination in ST , and the lemma does not refer to such flooding destinations.
2. Let r ∈ R, src ∈ R such that r receives an LSA from src and floods it to F D C (r, src). We will prove the claim for any possible flooding destinations, according to the definition of
, then either c ∈ SR or c ∈ AR. If c ∈ AR then it would be contradiction to the fact that there is no matching edge in the abstract topology. This implies that c ∈ SR. Therefore, there is a matching edge (c, c
Since src = r ′ , we can conclude that : src A = c (the abstract src is denoted as src A ), and therefore c ∈
, then there exists sn ∈ SN such that H (sn) = s. For each r ′ ∈ C s there exists c ∈ SR ∪ AR such that r ′ ∈ H (c). Also, there exists c ′ ∈ SR such that r = H (c ′ ) and DR (sn) = c ′ . If c ∈ SR then r ′ = r implies that c = c ′ , and src = r ′ implies that src A = c.(because the flooded messages are matching, thus their sources are matching). Therefore:
If c ∈ AR then r ′ = r implies that c = c ′ (because r is necessarily mapped by a concrete router which is designated router). Also, src A = c ′ because abstract router cannot be a src in the abstract model. Therefore:
, then there exists sn ∈ SN such that H (sn) = s. Therefore, there exists c ′ ∈ SR such that H (c ′ ) = r , and thus DR (s) = r ⇒ DR (sn) = c ′ . Also, src = DR (s) implies that DR (sn) = src A . Therefore:
Lemma 2: Matching fight back destinations Let T A be an abstract topology, and T C a matching concrete topology, such that H is their matching relation. The following matching between flooding destinations exists:
The proof is very similar to the one shown for Lemma 1.
Theorem proof Let T A and T C be an abstract and concrete topologies and let H be their matching relation. We will show for each possible abstract transition the following:
1. There exists a translation to a sequence of concrete transitions, starting from a concrete state that matches the initial state of the abstract transition. 2. The final concrete state of the translation matches the final abstract state of the original abstract transition. 3. At the final concrete state of the translation, all queues of concrete routers which are represented by a sub-topology in the abstract topology are empty, given that they were empty at the first state of the transition sequence.
We will first refer to possible abstract transitions taken by a singleton router. Let σ 1 sr − → σ 2 be an abstract transition taken by sr ∈ SR. Let σ 1 ′ be a concrete state that satisfies: σ 1 ′ ∈ h (σ 1 ). Let sr.Q 1 =< m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n > be the queue of sr at state σ 1 for some n ≥ 1. Let H (sr) .Q 1 =< m 1 ′ , m ′ 2 , ..., m p ′ > be the queue of H (sr) at state σ 1 ′ for some p ≥ 1. We will refer to the following cases, when each requires a different translation to the corresponding concrete run. If ¬∃st ∈ ST : (sr ∈ st), then the abstract transition represents a single concrete transition, because a sub-topology is not involved in the potential flooding. In addition, the abstract message must be matched with a single concrete message, since the source of the message cannot be a sub-topology (since sr is not in a sub-topology). Therefore, the translation to the concrete transition is straight-forward (whether the abstract transition was ignoring, flooding or sending a fight back). The matching proof is also simple in this case, and is relying on lemmas 1 and 2. In addition, for any sub-topology, the queues of the hidden routers remain empty after such a transition, because this transition does not involve any sub-topology. If ∃st ∈ ST : (sr ∈ st) , then the corresponding concrete run may involve several concrete transitions. Let m 1 ′ , ..., m t ′ be the matched sequence of messages for some 1 ≤ t ≤ p (if m 1 .src / ∈ ST then t = 1). We will refer to the possible actions performed in the abstract transition, and will show their corresponding translations.
If s, until all their queues become empty. At the end of this sequence, it is assured that the message will be flooded to the queues of the remaining visible routers in the sub-topology (not including sr itself), due to the constraints we imposed on a subtopology structure. It is clear how to generate the concrete transitions described at the first two parts. For the third part ,it is possible to choose any interleaving for which all invisible routers apply their concrete procedures until all their queues are emptied. It is easy to prove that there exists such an interleaving, based on the constraints mentioned in the sub-topology definition, and in particular -based on the fact that all invisible routers form a strongly connected component in the concrete topology. After all queues of invisible routers are emptied, their databases are installed with the flooded LSA, and the flooded LSA has been inserted to the queues of other visible routers. This can be easily proven if we assume by negation that there exists an invisible router for which its database was not installed with the flooded LSA, but it has a neighbor that was installed with that LSA (we can assume that there is necessarily such a neighbor, because at the beginning the message was inserted to at lease one of the invisible routers' queue which is an immediate neighbor of sr, the router which flooded the message, and due to the connectivity of the set of invisible routers).
Based on that, we can prove the matching of the final states. We denote by R S The set of invisible routers within the sub-topology in the concrete topology. Let σ k ′ be the final concrete state after the sequence of transitions described above are taken, starting from σ 1 ′ .
- 
